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"With fingernails that shine like justice
And a voice that is dark like tinted glass
She is fast, thorough, and sharp as a tack ......
This could describe some clients' description of an ideal attorney.1
Some clients adamantly demand an attorney be "a tiger out there
fighting."2 Attorneys are to be "zealous advocates" for their clients,
not only in court but also in negotiating contracts on their clients'
behalf.3 Furthermore, they generally must heed clients' wishes in court
and contracting within the limits of the law, which do not impose an
obligation to bargain in good faith with other contractors in the
absence of a fiduciary relationship or other special circumstances.4
Moreover, courts refrain from imposing moral or ethical bargaining
norms,5 and reserve Rule 11 sanctions for particularly abusive
attorney submissions.6
Policymakers and public advocates have become concerned
regarding companies' use of un-negotiated form arbitration provisions
in consumer and employment contracts to chill claims, evade liability,
and essentially privatize justice to their advantage.7 This led the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) National Consumer
Disputes Advisory Committee to adopt the Consumer Due Process
Protocol (Protocol) in 1998.8 The Protocol urges companies to offer
consumers arbitration provisions that give clear notice of arbitration
clauses, explain how to obtain information regarding the arbitration
1. CAKE, Short Skirt, Long Jacket, on COMFORT EAGLE (Sony 2001). These lyrics
continue with: "She's touring the facility and picking up slack / I want a girl with a short
skirt, / And a long, long jacket .... Id.
2. I will never forget this phrase, which a former client used in expressing concern
about my young age and small stature.
3. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl., para. 2 (2007).
4. Barnes & Robinson Co. v. OneSource Facility Servs., Inc., 195 S.W.3d 637, 643-
45 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (refusing to find a duty to negotiate in good faith absent an
express duty, and narrowly applying promissory estoppel to require clear economic loss
due to reasonable detrimental reliance).
5. Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 673,
678-80 (1969) (highlighting how common contract law does not necessarily conform to
parties' "private moral code").
6. Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasizing that
Rule 11 sanctions "are limited to 'paper[s]' signed in violation of the rule").
7. See generally EDWARD BRUNET, ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (2006) (collecting leading arbitration scholars' critiques and
suggested reforms of the Federal Arbitration Act). These same issues loom in many
uneven bargaining contexts, but this article will focus on consumer arbitration.
8. See generally NAT'L CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMM., AM.
ARBITRATION ASS'N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (1998) [hereinafter
PROTOCOL], available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019.
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process, preserve consumers' access to small claims court, and ensure
"reasonable cost to consumers" and "reasonably convenient" hearing
locations.9 Attorneys nonetheless draft, and companies continue to
impose, arbitration clauses that defy these standards in form
provisions consumers may not see, understand, or have power to
change.'0
Courts then apply formalistic, efficiency-focused contract law in
enforcing form arbitration provisions under the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA)" and states' adoptions of the Uniform Arbitration Act
(UAA). At the same time, proposals for federal legislative reforms
receive scholarly support,2 but lack political punch. 3 On July 12, 2007,
legislators again proposed bills in both the U.S. House and Senate to
prohibit enforcement of all pre-dispute arbitration agreements in
consumer, employment, and franchise contracts, or with respect to
any statutory claim protecting civil rights or regulating unequal
bargaining relationships.4 Both bills have been referred to their
respective judiciary committees,'5 where similar bills have evaporated
9. Id. at princs. 2, 5-7.
10. Alan S. Kaplinsky, The Use of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements by Consumer
Financial Services Providers, in 12TH ANNUAL CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES
INSTITUTE 35, 49 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 11165, 2007),
WL 1591 PLI/Corp 35 (including Citibank, Chase, AMEX, Discover Card, Bank of
America, Capital One, Washington Mutual, MBNA, and GE Capital in its list of
arbitration users); see also Amy J. Schmitz, Collected Cell Phone and Credit Card
Arbitration Provisions (May 15, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with South Texas
Law Review) [hereinafter Collected Arbitration Provisions] (finding arbitration clauses
prevalent in cell phone service contracts, and noting how nearly all the arbitration clauses
bar consumers' access to class relief).
11. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-92 (2000)
(emphasizing the "'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements"' (quoting Moses
H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983))); Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111-19 (2001) (enforcing arbitration agreements in
employment contracts).
12. See Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-
Dispute [Mandatory] Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069, 1086-94
(1998) (proposing statutory reform aimed at ensuring consumers' consent to arbitration of
statutory claims and access to fair proceedings); Paul D. Carrington, Regulating Dispute
Resolution Provisions in Adhesion Contracts, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 225, 228-32 (1998)
(suggesting legislative regulation of consumer, employment, and franchise arbitration).
13. See, e.g., H.R. 1994, 109th Cong. (2005) (addressing predatory mortgage lending
practices and barring enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer
transactions); H.R. 2969, 109th Cong. (2005) (precluding enforcement of pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in employment contracts); H.R. 3651, 109th Cong. (2005)
(amending the FAA to preclude arbitration of employment disputes unless the employee
and employer agree, in writing, to arbitrate after the dispute arises). All three bills died in
committee.
14. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782 & H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007).
15. 153 CONG. REC. H7774, S9135 (daily ed. July 12, 2007).
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each year.16 Instead of adopting such broad regulations, Congress only
has enacted a few targeted provisions barring enforcement of
arbitration requirements in consumer credit contracts for active-duty
military personnel and in motor vehicle franchise contracts.17
To be fair, many attorneys counsel corporate clients to temper
abusive arbitration clauses, and companies often heed such advice. 8 In
addition, fairly administered arbitration is not necessarily bad for
consumers and may provide them with higher recovery rates and
more efficient resolution of their claims than they would obtain in
court.19 Reasonably balanced arbitration procedures may provide
consumers with greater justice and opportunity to vent their stories
than they would experience through litigation."
Serious concerns nonetheless pervade the use of one-sided
arbitration clauses in adhesive consumer contracts that often include
provisions that bar class relief, preclude small claims court access,
curb remedies, and impose high fees and costs.2' Furthermore, clauses
that do not include all these provisions and appear balanced on their
faces may still burden consumers as applied due to lack of knowing
consent, limits on discovery, and repeat-player advantages in
arbitration.22 Indeed, how "fair" can pre-dispute arbitration clauses be
16. See supra note 13 (indicating how bills have lingered endlessly in committees each
year).
17. 10 U.S.C.A. § 987 (West Supp. 2007) (making arbitration clauses unlawful in
consumer credit contracts with military); Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Dispute
Resolution Process, 15 U.S.C. § 1226 (Supp. II 2002) (limiting agreements to arbitrate
motor vehicle franchise disputes to post-dispute, written contracts, and additionally,
requiring written explanations for any arbitration awards).
18. See generally Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to
Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (2004) (reporting findings from a study of arbitration clauses
and concluding that many arbitration clauses appear balanced and would avoid any
unconscionability ruling).
19. See generally W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individuation Critique,
49 ARIz. L. REV. 69 (2007) (explaining how arbitration can benefit consumers); Kirk D.
Jensen, Summaries of Empirical Studies and Surveys Regarding How Individuals Fare in
Arbitration, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 631, 631-32 (2006) (gathering studies and
surveys performed by various academics, companies, and institutions, and concluding that
the study did not support claims that consumers are disadvantaged by arbitration).
20. See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Curing Consumer Warranty Woes Through
Regulated Arbitration, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 627 (2008).
21. See Demaine & Hensler, supra note 18, at 71-73.
22. See id. at 72-74 (explaining how limits on discovery, class action preclusions, and
lack of knowing consent to these provisions harm consumers); David S. Schwartz,
Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in
an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 33, 60-61 (1997) (discussing corporate
defendants' repeat-player advantages in arbitration).
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for consumers in light of Congress's decision to bar imposition of
these clauses on members of the military?
This leads to unanswered questions regarding an attorney's
ethical obligations in representing and counseling corporate clients
considering adoption of arbitration clauses in their consumer
contracts.' 3 Professional conduct rules only send mixed messages
about attorneys' advocacy and advisory roles.24 At the outset, the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct suggest a client-centered
approach to attorneys' ethical obligations, directing attorneys to
"zealously assert[ ] the client's position under the rules of the
adversary system" and to seek "a result advantageous to the
client .... " Furthermore, they emphasize that attorneys are not
moral advisors.26
The Model Rules nonetheless require that attorneys' actions be
"consistent with requirements of honest dealings with others., 27 They
also direct attorneys to consider public interests as officers of the
court and refrain from "conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice. '"' Moreover, ethics rules are inherently
limited in their province and power, merely setting a floor for ethical
conduct.29 Authentic professionalism, central to career satisfaction,
calls attorneys to remain true to their own intrinsic values.0
23. I am not the first person to raise these issues. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution Processes: What's Happening
and What's Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 949, 953-55 (2002) (discussing attorneys' ethical
obligations and responsibilities in drafting and enforcing arbitration agreements).
24. See id. at 980-82 (noting contrasting developments with respect to arbitration
ethics and raising questions about what problems ethics rules can resolve).
25. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl., para. 2 (2007).
26. See Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1330-31
(2006) (explaining the Model Rules' approach that allows attorneys to raise ethical values
with clients, but "refrain from introducing their own values").
27. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl., para. 2.
28. Id. R. 8.4(d) (stating that it is professional misconduct for attorneys to "engage in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice").
29. Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an
Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 908-10 (1999)
(emphasizing that professional discipline rules are merely the low bar for ethical conduct);
Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney
Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1441-43 (1997) (discussing
personality characteristics of lawyers and law students and questioning the ability of the
Model Rules to instill values).
30. See Lawrence S. Krieger, The Inseparability of Professionalism and Personal
Satisfaction: Perspectives on Values, Integrity and Happiness, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 425,
429-37 (2005) (discussing the connections between happiness and an adherence to intrinsic
values, and emphasizing data supporting the correlation between authentic professionalism
and "well being and life satisfaction").
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This leaves attorneys without clear direction in drafting and
enforcing consumer arbitration provisions. The Model Rules'
advocacy focus seems to tell corporate attorneys to draft and enforce
pro-company arbitration clauses based on consumers' general
acceptance of form terms and the courts' usual enforcement of these
terms under the FAA. Advisor obligations nonetheless suggest that
attorneys should counsel clients on consent and fairness concerns
regarding one-sided arbitration clauses. Furthermore, broader ethical
obligations may warrant an attorney's refusal to draft or enforce
unconscionable or unfair arbitration provisions.
For example, a credit card company's attorneys may assume they
should suggest and draft an arbitration clause for the company's
consumer contracts that cuts consumers' access to class relief and
small claims courts as a means of curbing claims and lowering dispute
resolution costs.3 However, the conscientious attorney should also
explain to the company how a court may refuse to enforce this scheme
because it may unjustly deny consumers' access to remedies on their
small claims. Furthermore, an attorney's commitment to justice
should drive the attorney to urge the company to follow the Protocol
and to refuse to draft an arbitration provision that conflicts with such
fairness standards. Some may, nonetheless, argue that this insistence
on following fairness "shoulds" would breach an attorney's duty to
heed a client's wishes to take full advantage of consumer arbitration
provisions under pro-enforcement law.
This Article explores and invites further debate regarding such
ethical obligations with respect to companies' use of consumer
arbitration. Part I discusses attorneys' ethical obligations, as advocates
and advisors, in drafting and enforcing contracts. Part II summarizes
the legal and policy atmosphere in which attorneys draft and enforce
arbitration agreements on clients' behalf. Part III applies attorneys'
ethical obligations as advocates and advisors in this atmosphere and
considers attorneys' mixed and murky duties in representing
companies regarding their consumer arbitration programs. Part IV
provides suggestions for attorneys seeking to navigate these duties
31. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration
Agreements-with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM.
ARB. 251, 254-59 (2006) [hereinafter Ware, Adhesive Arbitration Agreements] (proposing
overall cost savings of pre-dispute arbitration clauses for companies and consumers); see
Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (with a
Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 195, 210-15 (1998)
[hereinafter Ware, Reply to Carrington & Haagen] (arguing that arbitration clauses benefit




and proposes that attorneys should urge or insist on corporate
compliance with the Protocol and fairness standards. The article
concludes by inviting further exploration of these ethical questions-
especially among educators and policymakers with means to foster
attorneys' attention to consumer concerns.
I. ATrORNEYS' ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS AS ADVOCATES AND
ADVISORS
Most states have adopted the American Bar Association's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys with few or no changes.32
These Rules assume the primacy of the adversarial system for
reaching the truth and rendering justice33 and merely set an essentially
amoral floor for attorney professionalism.34 Moreover, what an
attorney may ethically do in representing clients may not satisfy the
attorney's own intrinsic values.35 Therefore, it is important to
emphasize at the outset that regardless of the Model Rules, attorneys
should check their conduct with their own ethical compasses in order
to attain true professionalism and life satisfaction.36 That said, the
Model Rules and other ethics standards provide only mixed and
murky messages regarding attorneys' advocacy and advisory duties
with respect to drafting and enforcing contracts.37
32. Richard Klein, Legal Malpractice, Professional Discipline, and Representation of
the Indigent Defendant, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1171, 1175 (1988).
33. See generally MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM (1975) (noting the adversarial system's protection of personal autonomy); Lon L.
Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44
A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160-61 (1958) (discussing the adversarial process in American law).
34. Schiltz, supra note 29, at 908-09 (suggesting attorneys must strive to be ethical
beyond merely complying with rules); Martin H. Malin, Ethical Concerns in Drafting
Employment Arbitration Agreements After Circuit City and Green Tree, 41 BRANDEIS L.J.
779, 801-03 (2003) (discussing the attorney's role in the adversarial system, which many
use to justify attorney behavior others may deem immoral).
35. Rhode, supra note 26, at 1329-31 (discussing limits of the "client-centered"
approach used to justify attorney conduct that breaches the attorney's own moral code).
36. See generally Heinrich Racker, Ethics and Psycho-Analysis and the Psycho-
Analysis of Ethics, 47 INT'L J. PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 63 (1966) (emphasizing individuals'
connection to the greater world and importance of moral feelings to health and happiness);
Schiltz, supra note 29 (explaining professional discipline rules as only a starting point and
highlighting truly ethical and balanced living as essential to being a happy and healthy
attorney).
37. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl., para. 2 (2007); see Matthew J. Clark,
The Legal and Ethical Implications of Pre-Dispute Agreements Between Attorneys and
Clients to Arbitrate Fee Disputes, 84 IOWA L. REV. 827, 828 (1999) (discussing the
disagreement among courts and commentators regarding the ethical obligations of
attorneys with respect to arbitrating fee disputes with clients).
2008]
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A. Attorneys' Advocacy Obligations
The Model Rules begin with the premise and directive that
attorneys should zealously advocate and serve their clients' interests."
They further prescribe that attorneys should strive to prove facts and
present legal bases to support their clients' claims and interests.3 9 They
also require that attorneys abide by their clients' decisions regarding
objectives of representation and consult with their clients on the
means pursued to reach those objectives.' The Model Rules therefore
espouse an advocacy ethic built on an adversary system that assumes
truth and justice will be revealed through a battle among attorneys
who are all seeking to maximize the likelihood that their clients will
prevail."
Only "the limits imposed by law and the lawyer's professional
obligations" curtail this duty of allegiance to the clients' objectives.
Attorneys must therefore refrain from assisting or counseling clients
"in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent."4 3 They
also must "not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact
or law to a third person; or (b) fail to disclose a material fact when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act
by a client.""
The Model Rules also set barriers on attorneys' interactions with
non-clients involved in a legal matter.4 ' They preclude attorneys from
communicating with parties known to be represented by another
lawyer in the matter, 6 and direct attorneys to make "reasonable
efforts" to correct an unrepresented person's misunderstanding of the
41attorney's role in the case. In addition, attorneys must "not use
means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass,
38. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr pmbl., para. 2. See generally Charles Fried,
The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J.
1060 (1976) (defending attorneys' undiluted allegiance to their clients' goals as essential to
ensure that clients achieve full access to legal benefits).
39. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 & cmt. 1 (emphasizing attorneys'
advocacy duties in proving their clients' claims).
40. Id. R. 1.2(a).
41. Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
543, 546-52 (1983) (explaining the common understanding of a lawyer's advocacy
responsibility and accountability).
42. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 & cmt. 1, R. 1.4.
43. Id. R. 1.2(d).
44. Id. R. 4.1.
45. Id. R. 4.2, R. 4.3, R. 4.4.
46. Id. R. 4.2.
47. Id. R. 4.3.
[Vol. 49:841
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delay, or burden a third person."'
The overall approach of the Model Rules has been described as
"client-centered" in that it myopically focuses on clients' needs and
wishes.49 Furthermore, the Model Rules narrowly restrict only
particularly bad attorney conduct, such as purposely or knowingly
pursuing illegal, fraudulent, or substantially burdensome means or
ends on behalf of their clients." The Model Rules do not require
attorneys to investigate the legality of their clients' actions or to
refrain from assisting clients in achieving lawful objectives the
attorneys may deem immoral in other settings.
This has bred a sense of "moral nonaccountability" among many
attorneys, who use the client-centered approach to justify actions on
their clients' behalf that may be ethically questionable but technically
legal." For example, the Model Rules would direct attorneys
representing a lender in a payment collection action to strive to prove
facts and present legal bases to support the client's right to payment,
regardless of the debtor's financial and personal hardships. 2 The
Model Rules nonetheless preclude the attorneys from submitting
evidence or affidavits they know are false because that would amount
to fraud on the court. 3 The Model Rules do not preclude the
attorneys from submitting affidavits they merely suspect, but do not
know, to be false. Moreover, they do not obligate the attorneys to
investigate or consider the debtors' life circumstances or the likely
impact on the debtors of collection actions.
In the transactional context, the Model Rules similarly suggest
that attorneys must zealously advocate their clients' positions and
seek to achieve the clients' objectives, within legal limits. 6
Furthermore, the Model Rules again prescribe very limited restraints
with respect to attorneys' conduct with non-clients. 7 At the same
48. Id. R. 4.4.
49. See Rhode, supra note 26, at 1329-31 (discussing the "client-centered" approach).
50. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d), R. 1.5(a).
51. See Schwartz, supra note 41, at 543-45 (explaining the "Principle of
Nonaccountability" that flows from the advocacy ethic).
52. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.1.
53. Id. (precluding attorneys from pursuing a proceeding or asserting issues therein
"unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so").
54. Id. R. 1.2(d) (only clearly barring conduct the lawyer "knows is criminal or
fraudulent" and leaving an attorney's duty to investigate unclear).
55. See id. pmbl., para. 2 (stating that an attorney is to "zealously" assert his client's
position and making no mention of a duty to investigate the effect of their advocacy on
opposing parties).
56. See id.
57. Id. R. 4.2, R. 4.3.
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time, contract law does not impose a duty to negotiate in good faith
with third parties in the absence of a fiduciary or other special
relationship with those parties.58 Again, the Model Rules merely
preclude what most would consider egregious conduct, such as lying
or seeking to harass third parties. 9
Still, some have argued that attorneys should be more
accountable for the fairness of means and objectives in drafting and
negotiating contracts because there is no neutral third party refereeing
the process as there is in court.6" Furthermore, attorneys generally
may decline to represent clients in transactions without denying them
necessary legal assistance because there is no overriding social need
for such assistance in civil transactions as there is in criminal matters.61
This suggests that attorneys should refuse to assist clients in means or
ends that may be technically lawful but nonetheless "unfair,
unconscionable, or unjust.' 62
These arguments apply with special force to form contracts in
uneven bargaining contexts. "As Brandeis insisted, the model of the
lawyer as fearless combatant simply has no bearing on the
circumstances in which lawyers employ their talents to the detriment
of unrepresented interests., 63 Attorneys therefore may have a
professional duty to restrain their zeal and refrain from drafting
unconscionable form contracts. 64 Zeal is misplaced in drafting form
contracts because no real adversary exists to resist imposition of
onerous provisions that "disgrace" the legal profession.65 Furthermore,
zeal is especially improper with respect to consumer arbitration
clauses that effectually insulate companies from regulation or liability
by stripping individuals' access to reasonable procedures needed to
58. Barnes & Robinson Co. v. OneSource Facility Servs., Inc., 195 S.W.3d 637, 644
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (finding no duty to negotiate in good faith absent an express duty).
59. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4.
60. See Schwartz, supra note 41, at 546-63 (arguing for limits on moral accountability
in transactions due to the absence of third party neutrals and the ability to decline
engagement); Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66
CAL. L. REv. 669, 670-72 (1978) (proposing that attorneys may not hide behind advocacy
obligations to justify immoral conduct on a client's behalf); Paul D. Carrington,
Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 361 (2002) (proposing limits on form
contracting).
61. Schwartz, supra note 41, at 557.
62. See generally Schwartz, supra note 60, at 679-94 (explaining this proposal and
justifications for advising against and refusing to represent clients in lawful but
unconscionable means or objectives, unless the attorney owes a special duty to provide
legal assistance in the matter).
63. Carrington, supra note 60, at 383.
64. Id. at 361-73 (explaining need for ethical limits on form contracting).
65. Id. at 361, 370-71.
850 [Vol. 49:841
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vindicate their substantive rights. 6
Of course, reasonable minds can disagree on what is "unfair,
unconscionable, or unjust."" Courts already struggle and disagree on
what contract provisions are unconscionable. 68 Attorneys and their
clients likewise struggle to determine what contract provisions are
legally unconscionable, or simply unfair. Attorneys are therefore left
in a sometimes uncomfortable balancing act among advocacy
obligations and personal values in drafting and negotiating clients'
contracts.
B. Attorneys' Advisory Role
Ethics rules charge attorneys not only to serve as advocates for
their clients in and out of court, but also to advise their clients with
respect to these various actions.69 The thrust of this advisory role
requires attorneys to inform clients about all factors affecting a
client's interests. The substance and parameters of what falls under
this umbrella of "interests" remains unclear beyond those factors that
directly impact clients' financial and legal interests. The ethics rules
therefore leave attorneys with limited guidance regarding their duties
in advising clients regarding factors that may not directly impact
clients' needs, but do have significant effects on third parties or the
justice system.
1. Impact on Clients' Interests
An attorney's advisory obligations to clients give further richness
to the attorney-client relationship, and the honesty and loyalty it
entails. The Model Rules require that attorneys "exercise independent
professional judgment and render candid advice" to their clients.7' The
Model Rules further provide that this advice "may refer not only to
law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and
political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation."7'
The attorney-client relationship is a true human relationship, not
66. Id. at 361-62.
67. Schwartz, supra note 60, at 679.
68. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.b (discussing courts' disagreement on an
unconscionability argument's application to arbitration clauses).
69. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2007); see also MODEL CODE
OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3, 7-5, 7-8 (1983) (discussing attorneys' role as
counselor in the Code of Professional Responsibility Ethical Considerations, which the
ABA replaced with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
70. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1.
71. Id.
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simply a sanitized legal construct. This requires attorneys to
communicate openly with clients about the legal and practical effects
of clients' options, objectives, and the means clients may choose for
achieving their goals." Attorneys should explain to clients the legal
and financial ramifications of their clients' situations, and of any
actions that the attorneys may pursue on their clients' behalf.3
Attorneys also owe their clients full information about their options
and how various actions may impact the clients' time, reputations,
relationships, and emotional health.4
For example, an attorney representing a lender should inform the
lender that an unsecured debtor is on the verge of filing for
bankruptcy and explain the client's various options for collecting on
the debt. Furthermore, the attorney would be obligated to inform the
client about the fees and costs the client would likely bear in having
the attorney pursue various judicial and non-judicial actions to collect
payment on the debt. The attorney should also explain to the client
the time commitment required by the individuals involved and how
pursuing different actions may impact the client's reputation.
Questions would nonetheless remain regarding what other factors
"may be relevant to the client's situation" with respect to third parties
and the justice system.75
2. Affect on Third Parties
Attorneys' advisory obligations are especially unclear regarding
the extent and substance of any ethical obligations to look out for
third parties' interests. The Model Rules say very little about
attorneys' responsibility for third parties' concerns, let alone the
extent to which an attorney should raise these concerns with clients or
refuse to represent a client who insists on actions detrimental to public
interests.76 Instead, the Model Rules merely allude to vague ethical
considerations. At the same time, the Rules' comments send a
somewhat conflicting message that "[a]lthough a lawyer is not a moral
advisor as such, moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most
legal questions and may decisively influence how the law will be
72. Id. pmbl.
73. Id. R. 1.4(b), R. 2.1 & cmt. 1.
74. Id. R. 2.1 & cmt.
75. Id. R. 2.1.
76. Id. R. 2.1 cmt. 2 ("Advice couched in narrow legal terms may be of little value to





This begs questions regarding what third party concerns are
relevant to "legal questions, 78 or may "decisively influence"'7 9
application of the law. For example, the lender's attorney should
inform the lender of factors that may influence whether the debtor is
likely to work out a payment plan or file for bankruptcy. The attorney
should also explain any equitable factors that may affect a bankruptcy
court's decisions, and perhaps investigate why the debtor has missed
payments in order to gather this information.
It is unclear, however, how far the attorney should go in
investigating and advising the lender regarding the debtor's situation.
Should the attorney consider information regarding the debtor's bad
health and personal hardships that likely led to the missed payments?
Would it be improper for the attorney to advise the client to forego
filing a collection action due to compassion for the debtor's situation?
An attorney's broader advisory and professional obligations may
drive an attorney to raise such considerations, but the Model Rules'
advocacy focus seems to require the attorney to pursue collection
actions where failure to do so could preclude the client's collection on
the debt or open the door to waiver defenses to timely payments.
At the same time, attorneys essentially have no advisory
obligations to third parties to whom they owe no fiduciary duties.'
Instead, Model Rule 4.3 precludes an attorney from offering advice to
unrepresented parties other than advising that they secure their own
counsel.81 Many courts find that attorneys do not even owe duties to
potential clients in negotiating arbitration clauses in initial fee
agreements.8 In McGuire, Cornwell & Blakey v. Grider, for example,
the court rejected a client's fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and
violation of professional conduct claims against his former attorney




80. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (stating the attorney's duties
to his or her "client"); Clark, supra note 37 (highlighting the limited ethical obligations of
attorneys in transactions with potential clients).
81. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 ("The lawyer shall not give legal
advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a
reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client.").
82. See Clark, supra note 37, at 851-64 (examining enforcement of arbitration clauses
in attorneys' engagement contracts).
83. McGuire, Cornwell & Blakey v. Grider, 765 F. Supp. 1048, 1050-52 (D. Colo.
1991).
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court emphasized that the client could have no claims with respect to
an arbitration clause in an initial fee agreement because no fiduciary
obligations arose until after the client signed the retainer agreement.'
3. Stewards of the Justice System
News of corporate scandals and attorney misconduct has fueled
public cries for more stringent ethical protection of the justice
system.85 The Model Rules nonetheless provide unclear direction
regarding an attorney's obligations as an "officer of the legal system
and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice."'86 The Model Rules preclude attorneys from submitting false
evidence or engaging in "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit
or misrepresentation," but fail to further define this conduct.7 In
addition, they vaguely bar attorneys from engaging in "conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice."88
The rhetoric of these Model Rules is difficult to apply. The
Model Rules prohibit lies and false evidence in court, but stakeholders
in the system disagree on what otherwise lawful conduct is sufficiently
dishonest or prejudicial to the justice system to warrant discipline.
Moreover, it is left to individual attorneys to determine the extent to
which they should advise clients on how their contemplated objectives
comport with "the purpose and spirit, as well as letter, of the law."'89
Still, attorneys do have special obligations to the justice system.
As Professor Rhode has argued: "As gatekeepers in imperfect legal
processes, lawyers have obligations that transcend those owed to any
particular client. Honesty, trust, and fairness are collective goods;
neither legal nor market systems can function effectively if lawyers
assume no social responsibility for the consequences of their
counseling role." 9 Attorneys cannot impose their visions of public
policy on clients, but they can offer advice as stewards of the legal
system. This also requires attorneys to use their training and
experience to facilitate processes and solve problems that advance,
84. Id. at 1051 (finding no attorney-client relationship exists before a prospective
client signs an engagement agreement).
85. See Rhode, supra note 26, at 1317-18 (emphasizing call for ethics).
86. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr pmbl., para. 1; Rhode, supra note 26, at
1337 (quoting the preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and arguing that
attorneys should take this responsibility more seriously).
87. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4, R. 8.4.
88. Id. R. 8.4.
89. Rhode, supra note 26, at 1331.
90. Id. at 1330.
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not hinder, public interests.91
Furthermore, legal educators should raise and generate
discussion with students regarding the ethical values underlying the
justice system.' Teachers should also spark textured discussion of
attorneys' obligations as officers of the legal system and aid students
in developing strategies for considering these obligations in carrying
out their advocacy and advisory duties. 93 Law schools should send
aspiring attorneys into the profession with an overriding obligation to
do no harm.94 Educators have heightened opportunities to foster
deeper commitments to ethics and authentic professionalism, and
consequently, to produce more effective and happy attorneys.9
Responsibilities for the justice system therefore deepen
attorneys' obligations in advising clients regarding their objectives and
actions. Furthermore, the Model Rules' emphasis on zealous advocacy
assumes relatively equal advocacy on behalf of all parties involved, as
well as a neutral judge or jury to referee the process, determine the
truth, and render justice.96 However, as Professor Murray Schwartz
has explained, with respect to counseling clients, "[t]here is no third-
party tribunal, no adverse party, and no rules of procedure; the lawyer
and the client are on their own." 97 Instead, the attorney-client
relationship involves human interactions and collaborative efforts that
may have broad implications.98
This is especially true when attorneys draft contracts and advise
clients on matters that affect unrepresented parties. Professionalism
therefore calls attorneys to refrain from assisting corporate clients in
taking advantage of their form contract control to consumers'
91. Fuller & Randall, supra note 33, at 1162 (emphasizing attorneys' duties "in the art
of devising arrangements that will put in workable order the entangled affairs and interests
of human beings," and promoting "the larger processes in which [they] participate[]").
92. Rhode, supra note 26, at 1336-37 (emphasizing educators' roles in teaching
strategies for navigating the moral foundations and limitations of the justice system).
93. Id.
94. See Heinrich Von Staden, "In a Pure and Holy Way": Personal and Professional
Conduct in the Hippocratic Oath?, 51 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED SCI. 404, 405-08 (1996)
(offering a translation of physicians' Hippocratic oath).
95. See Krieger, supra note 30, at 425-28, 437-38 (finding that law school currently
"appears to push students toward values and motives likely to produce both unhappiness
and unprofessional behavior in the future").
96. Schwartz, supra note 60, at 669-78 (distinguishing an attorney's ethical
accountability in advocating a client's case in court versus representing a client in
transactions).
97. Id. at 677.
98. See Fuller & Randall, supra note 33, at 1161-62 (discussing the limits of advocacy
in counseling contexts).
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disadvantage. 99 Attorneys obstruct, not protect, justice when they seek
"petty advantages to the detriment" of the public good."°
II. LAW AND POLICY OF CONSUMER ARBITRATION
Law and policy are sometimes at odds with respect to consumer
arbitration. Consumer advocates and commentators lament
consumers' loss of rights and remedies through companies' onerous
arbitration programs. 1" The law, however, generally condones
enforcement of arbitration clauses in form consumer contracts despite
questionable consent.'O In addition, the law interacts with form
contracting norms to allow for what I have called the "dominos of
deference": (a) companies promulgate form arbitration clauses that
curtail consumer remedies; (b) arbitration administering institutions
and arbitrators may favor these companies as repeat clientele; (c)
consumers rarely read or attempt to negotiate these clauses due to
lack of awareness, resources, and bargaining power; and (d) courts
enforce these clauses with the preemptive force of the FAA and
formalistic application of contract defenses.0 3 This raises ethical
questions for attorneys who draft and enforce these clauses, torn by
tensions between taking advantage of the domino effect versus
promoting fair and balanced use of arbitration.
A. Pro-Arbitration Legal Forces
United States courts generally must enforce arbitration
agreements in accordance with the Supreme Court's pro-enforcement
reading of the FAA."' They also follow the Court's holding that the
FAA preempts state law hindering or discriminating against
arbitration, which limits courts' scrutiny of arbitration agreements to
nearly extinct statutory arguments and general contract defenses such
as lack of assent, unconscionability, or fraud.05 Many courts then
99. Id. at 1162.
100. Id.
101. See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Dangers of Deference to Form Arbitration
Provisions, 8 NEV. L.J. 37 (2007).
102. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91-92 (2000).
103. Schmitz, supra note 101, at 38, 45-50.
104. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); see also Richard C.
Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85
CAL. L. REV. 577, 602-10 (1997) (critiquing courts' agreement that private arbitration does
not constitute state action subject to constitutional requirements).
105. See, e.g., Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 (discussing how the FAA preempts state laws
regarding arbitration agreements).
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apply these general defenses in narrow and formalistic fashions.'O° In
addition, courts heed Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna's
charge that they narrowly limit their scrutiny of arbitration clauses to
only the enforceability of arbitration agreements themselves, and
order arbitration of challenges that implicate the contracts as a
whole."7
1. Arbitrability of Statutory Rights
The Supreme Court has held that statutory claims may be
arbitrated unless the statute expressly precludes arbitration or there is
very strong evidence that arbitration would severely hinder the
statute's purpose.08 Therefore, the Court has condoned arbitration of
a broad range of statutory claims covering everything from
discrimination to consumer lending and securities fraud."M
Furthermore, courts have agreed that arbitration of statutory claims
does not constitute state action subject to constitutional due process
requirements. ° They also have interpreted arbitration clauses broadly
to cover contract, tort, and statutory claims regardless of whether the
clauses make express reference to or provide notice of statutory
coverage."
Accordingly, most courts have held that consumer warranty
106. See Speidel, supra note 12, at 1079-80 (emphasizing how FAA preemption and
courts' narrow application of general contract defenses make it "difficult if not impossible"
to avoid arbitration agreements); Irma S. Russell, Got Wheels?: Article 2A, Standardized
Rental Car Terms, Rational Inaction, and Unilateral Private Ordering, 40 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 137, 140-43 (2006) (explaining how courts condone dominant drafters' control of
form contracting).
107. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006) (holding
the illegality defense at issue was for the arbitrator and not the court because the defense
did not target the arbitration clause, but the contract itself); see also Richard L. Barnes,
Buckeye, Bull's-Eye, or Moving Target: The FAA, Compulsory Arbitration, and Common-
Law Contract, 31 VT. L. REV. 141, 174-75, 184 (2006) (discussing the narrowing impact of
Buckeye).
108. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
109. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-92 (2000) (finding Truth
in Lending Act (TILA) claims under a consumer financing agreement may be subject to
binding arbitration under the FAA); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989) (overruling prior opinion to hold securities claims arbitrable).
110. See Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications of
Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1748, 1757-58, 1763-66 (2006)
(noting American courts' conclusion that private arbitration does not involve state action
but critiquing this conclusion with respect to arbitral class actions).
111. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29 (finding statutory age discrimination statute could be
subject to arbitration, explaining that arbitration clauses are little more than specialized
forum selection clauses).
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claims under the Magnusson Moss Warranty Act (MMWA) may be
subject to arbitration."' This is true even where a form arbitration
provision requires consumers to arbitrate in far locations and imposes
high fees on small dollar claims.1 '3 In addition, courts usually deny
consumers' claims that high arbitration initiation costs have an undue
"chilling effect" on their statutory rights.' This is because consumers
generally cannot satisfy the burden of proving the prohibitive costs of
arbitration set by the Supreme Court in Green Tree Financial Corp. v.
Randolph."5 In that case, the Court set a high burden on proving
prohibitive costs in concluding that the Randolphs failed to prove that
their inability to pay extreme costs would preclude vindication of their
Truth in Lending Act (TILA) claims."6 The Court also paved the way
for other courts to rely on expectations that companies would offer to
pay truly onerous costs or that arbitrators would waive or reallocate
these fees."7
At the same time, consumers rarely avoid arbitration based on
claims that an arbitration agreement's preclusions of class relief,
recovery of punitive damages, or attorneys' fees awards prevents them
from asserting their statutory rights."8 In addition, consumers who
112. The MMWA provides consumers with special warranty protections and allows
them to collect attorneys' fees in seeking to enforce those protections. See Schmitz, supra
note 20, at 26-30 (discussing courts' general allowance for arbitration of MMWA rights).
113. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148-50 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting
the consumer's claim that they should not be compelled to arbitrate their MMWA claims
regarding a $4,000 computer because the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) rules
incorporated in the form arbitration clause required the consumers to pay upwards of
$2,000 in arbitration costs). But see Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339-40
(D. Kan. 2000) (refusing to follow Hill regarding enforcement of the same clause).
114. See, e.g., James v. McDonald's Corp., 417 F.3d 672, 678-80 (7th Cir. 2005)
(rejecting cost-based challenge of arbitration agreement).
115. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-92 (2000) (explaining that
although Randolph had provided information regarding high AAA arbitration fees and
costs, it was not clear that she would bear these costs and that she could not pay them).
116. Id. at 91-92.
117. See id. See also James, 417 F.3d at 675-80 (emphasizing that consumers would
have to show that arbitration was truly more expensive than litigation in terms of overall
costs); Bailey v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 346 F.3d 821, 823-24 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding
cost challenge of arbitrability was for the arbitrator to decide under the parties'
agreement); Phillips v. Assocs. Home Equity Servs., Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 840, 847 (N.D. I11.
2001) (finding individual could not be compelled to arbitrate if required to bear the
prohibitive arbitration costs but stating that it would reconsider its ruling if the defendants
agreed to pay these costs). But see Ball v. SFX Broad., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 230, 238-240
(N.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding employee could not be compelled to arbitrate her statutory
claims because she had satisfied the burden of proving prohibitive arbitration costs).
118. See Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 629 S.E.2d 865, 870-75 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2006) (denying consumer's challenge of an arbitration clause based on high costs,
class action waiver, and award limitations despite evidence that the consumer lived on very
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prevail on challenges against arbitration of their statutory claims may
face costs and burdens of asserting statutory claims in court while
arbitrating the tort and contract claims stemming from the same
facts." 9 They also may have to arbitrate statutory claims against some,
but not all, of the parties who may bear responsibility for the claims. 2 '
2. Common Law Contract Defenses
The most feasible challenges of arbitration provisions are based
on general contract defenses such as lack of assent, unconscionability,
no consideration, or fraud.'21 These challenges are narrow and limited.
They must be aimed at an arbitration clause itself, as opposed to the
contract as a whole. 22 In addition, courts have applied them in
formalistic fashions based on classical contract norms and efficiency
arguments.1
21
a. Lack of Assent
Courts generally deny consumers' lack of assent challenges to
form arbitration clauses. They reason that consumers remain free to
walk away from the contract or seek goods or services elsewhere.
limited means); Anders v. Hometown Mortgage Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 1024, 1027-32 (11th
Cir. 2003) (leaving to the arbitrator the mortgagors' argument that an arbitration provision
precluding punitive and treble damages violated the TILA).
119. Browne v. Kline Tysons Imps., Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 827, 833 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(allowing litigation of MMWA claims, but ordering arbitration of TILA and state statutory
and common law claims arising out of car sale); Ball, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 238-40 (requiring
arbitration of the employee's non-statutory claims although she had prevailed on her cost-
based challenge on the statutory claims).
120. See Ex parte Jones, Inc., 686 So. 2d 1166, 1168 (Ala. 1996) (finding there was no
agreement to arbitrate between consumers and the non-signatory to the arbitration
agreement); Ex parte Martin, 703 So. 2d 883, 886-87 (Ala. 1996) (holding arbitration clause
in loan agreement between buyers and sellers did not apply to manufacturer). But see Ex
parte Gates, 675 So. 2d 371, 374-75 (Ala. 1996) (enforcing arbitration against a consumer
on behalf of non-signatory manufacturer based on broad arbitration clause).
121. See Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 478 (5th Cir. 2002)
(emphasizing that "courts can consider individual claims of fraud or unconscionability in
arbitration agreements as they would in any other contract").
122. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967)
(solidifying the "severability" concept limiting courts' consideration of arbitration clauses
to attacks on an arbitration clause itself); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546
U.S. 440, 444-45 (2006) (emphasizing that the "severability" rule is a matter of federal law
that precludes the court from deciding defenses going to a contract as a whole, including
claims that the contract was illegal).
123. See Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability's Safety Net Function, 58 ALA.
L. REV. 73, 90-102 (2006) (discussing formalistic application of contract defenses).
124. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997) (enforcing form
computer purchase contract requiring arbitration under ICC rules). But see Brower v.
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They also rest their conclusions on classical contract principles
embracing objective enforcement,"' and economic notions that strict
enforcement of form terms fosters efficiencies companies may pass on
to consumers through lower prices and better quality."'
They therefore have enforced so-called "boilerplate" form terms
in papers sent with bills, product packaging, and "clickwrap" e-
provisions accessible through links in contracts formed over the
Internet.'" The court in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., for example,
enforced an arbitration clause in purchase terms buried among the
papers that came with a computer the Hills bought over the phone.'
The court emphasized that it is the consumer's duty to read form
terms and that strict enforcement of form terms fosters efficient
contracting 9 Furthermore, the court condoned the arbitration clause
altiough it curtailed the Hills' right to recover attorneys' fees under
the MMWA. 3°
Courts have applied this same reasoning to find assent to
arbitration clauses in cellular phone service contracts where
consumers must accept the clauses or cancel the service.' Courts also
have enforced arbitration clauses contained in the packaging of
products consumers did not purchase but received as gifts. 132
Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572-76 (App. Div. 1998) (enforcing the identical
Gateway arbitration clause, but vacating the portion of the clause requiring arbitration
before the ICC due to the "excessive cost factor that is necessarily entailed in arbitrating
before the ICC"). See also Jean R. Sternlight, Recent Decision Opens Wider Gateway to
Unfair Binding Arbitration, 8 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 129, 130-32 (1997)
(discussing the Hill case).
125. See Peter A. Alces, Guerilla Terms, 56 EMORY L.J. 1511, 1515-20 (2007)
(discussing objective and subjective enforcement theories); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 160-88 (1977) (discussing the will
theory of contract).
126. See generally Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 187 (2006) (questioning claims that form arbitration provisions in consumer contracts
are unfair); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (2002) (explaining why electronic contracts
promote efficiency and are not adhesion contracts).
127. See Alces, supra note 125, at 1521-23 (discussing the expanding world of
contracting practices).
128. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148,1150-51.
129. Id. at 1149 (stating that "approve-or-return" provisions such as that in Hill make
consumers better off "as a group").
130. Id. at 1151.
131. Chandler v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d 701, 704-06 (S.D. Ill.
2005).
132. Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 16913, 2000 WL 307369, at *1 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 16, 2000) (mem.) (not designated for publication) (enforcing arbitration clause in the
box with a computer consumer received as a gift).
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Furthermore, courts have rejected employees' challenges of
arbitration agreements employers provided after the employees have
been hired, especially where employees have an opportunity to reject
the agreements or accept them through their silence. 33
b. Unconscionability
Consumers often pair lack of assent arguments with
unconscionability challenges of arbitration clauses.' This requires
consumers to prove the clauses are both substantively and
procedurally unconscionable.'35 Procedural unconscionability asks
whether the bargaining process was unduly one-sided, whereas
substantive unconscionability requires that the terms of the provision
be extremely oppressive or otherwise unfair.136 Although some courts
apply a sliding scale, most courts strictly require strong showings of
both prongs.137 This leaves consumers with limited and uncertain
results on their unconscionability claims.
As an initial matter, consumers must show that a seller provides
the challenged arbitration provision without negotiation. 13' They also
must show that the provision contains oppressive terms such as
"carve-outs" for the sellers' option to litigate, cost and fee allocations
that overly burden consumers, inconvenient arbitration hearing
locations, and preclusions of statutory remedies.139 A court may then
find the whole arbitration clause, or only certain procedural
provisions, unconscionable.14" If the court finds all or part of the clause
133. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2002).
134. Id. at 1108.
135. Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 265-66, 270 (3d Cir. 2003).
136. See id. at 265, 270 (finding "take-it-or-leave-it" contract prepared by the
employer without negotiation by the employees was procedurally unconscionable); Ingle v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1170-73 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding one-year limitation
on claims under the arbitration clause in an employment contract was substantively
unconscionable because it deprived employees of the benefit of the continuing violations
doctrine available under a state employment discrimination statute).
137. Schmitz, supra note 123, at 73-90 (exploring development, evolution, and
functions of unconscionability, and critiquing courts' formulaic application of
unconscionability); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium:
The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757, 812-13 (2004) (emphasizing slow and restrained
application of unconscionability in the wake of formalist intellectual and social
developments).
138. See Alexander, 341 F.3d at 265 (describing adhesion contracts).
139. See CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND
PROBLEMS 113-14 (2002) (listing suspect terms and citing cases supporting and denying
these claims).
140. See Harold Allen's Mobile Home Factory Outlet, Inc. v. Butler, 825 So. 2d 779,
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unconscionable, the court thereafter may refuse to order arbitration
or order arbitration without the offending procedures.141
For example, the court in Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc. recently
denied an internet-based virtual world developer's motion to arbitrate
a consumer's claims against the developer based on its finding that the
arbitration clause in the developer's "click-wrap" e-contract was
unconscionable.142 In order to participate in Second Life, the
developer's virtual world, the consumer clicked a button indicating his
acceptance of the developer's terms of service, which included the
arbitration clause in the thirteenth paragraph under "General
Conditions., 143  The court found the clause procedurally
unconscionable because it was "buried" among nonnegotiable terms
and the consumer had no real alternative for accessing virtual world
services like Second Life.1" The court also found that the clause was
substantively unconscionable because it allowed the developer to
unilaterally modify the terms and required confidential ICC
arbitration in California, which would impose high costs on the
consumer and hinder future claimants' access to needed evidence. 45
The court then refused to order arbitration, rejecting the developer's
141
offer to arbitrate without the offending provisions.
Success on unconscionability claims is nonetheless uncommon.1 4 7
In Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., for example, the court
denied the consumers' challenge of an arbitration provision in their
loan agreements although the provision subjected the consumers to
onerous arbitration and appeal costs, precluded class relief, and
785 (Ala. 2002) (finding that an arbitration provision was fundamentally unfair because it
gave consumer no voice in arbitrator selection).
141. Id.
142. Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 606-11 (E.D. Pa. 2007)
(mem.).
143. See id. at 595, 603-04 (explaining that Second Life is an Internet-based virtual
environment in which users can become virtual characters, interact with other characters,
and buy and sell virtual property).
144. Id. at 606-07.
145. Id. at 607-10.
146. Id. at 612-13.
147. See, e.g., Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1077 (5th Cir. 2002)
(denying unconscionability challenge to an arbitration agreement); Johnnie's Homes, Inc.
v. Holt, 790 So. 2d 956, 963-65 (Ala. 2001) (enforcing a consumer's duty to arbitrate breach
of warranty, fraud, and other claims); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Lewis, 813 So. 2d 820, 825
(Ala. 2001) (denying unconscionability challenge to arbitration clause by illiterate
consumer); Garcia v. Wayne Homes, LLC, No. 2001 CA 53, 2002 WL 628619, at *13 (Ohio
App. 2d Apr. 19, 2002) (not designated for publication) (denying unconscionability
challenge based on risk of prohibitive arbitration costs).
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lacked mutuality.1 48 The court therefore rejected the trial court's
findings that the arbitration provision was unduly one-sided and
effectively precluded the low-income consumers' access to remedies
by requiring them to assert their claims individually before arbitrators
with average daily rates of $1,225.' The court concluded that
litigation would likely cost more than arbitration, class action waivers
are generally enforceable, and North Carolina does not impose a
"mutuality of obligations" requirement.I0
c. Lack of Consideration, Fraud, and Misrepresentation
Consumers assert with very little success lack of consideration,
fraud, and misrepresentation challenges to arbitration clauses. Lack of
consideration claims usually fail because it is sufficient if an
arbitration provision is mutual or is one of many promises in a
contract.15 Consumers therefore have the highest chance of success on
such claims where the provision only binds the consumer or is heavily
one-sided.5 2 Even these challenges often fail, however, because many
courts will strive to find other contract provisions or circumstances
that constitute sufficient consideration to uphold these arbitration
clauses.'53
Fraud and misrepresentation claims also meet very limited
success." ' These claims must be narrowly directed to the arbitration
provision, and not the contract as a whole.' Furthermore, fraud
claimants bear a heavy burden in proving that the contract drafter
148. Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 629 S.E.2d 865, 875 (N.C. Ct. App.
2006).
149. Id. at 879-80 (dissenting opinion) (emphasizing the trial court's findings, which
the dissent argues the majority largely ignored).
150. Id. at 875 (majority opinion).
151. See Hawkins v. Aid Ass'n for Lutherans, 338 F.3d 801, 808 (7th Cir. 2003)
(emphasizing that consideration need not lie in the arbitration provision itself where the
contract in which it is included is supported by consideration).
152. See Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 861-62 (W. Va. 1998)
(holding arbitration provision in consumer loan contract unconscionable where form
provision allowed lender to seek foreclosure and collection actions in court).
153. See Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 342-45 (Ky. Ct. App.
2001) (denying consumers' challenge to an arbitration provision in a financing contract that
allowed the lender to litigate collection and foreclosure suits, and emphasizing that courts
almost uniformly reject such challenges).
154. See, e.g., In re FirstMerit Bank, 52 S.W.3d 749, 756-58 (Tex. 2001) (denying
challenges to an arbitration clause based on fraud, unconscionability, duress, and
revocation).
155. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967)
(holding that fraud in the inducement is an arbitrability question for the court unless it
goes directly to the arbitration clause).
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intentionally or recklessly made material misrepresentations about the
arbitration that the claimants relied on in accepting the arbitration
provision.'56
For example, consumers in FirstMerit Bank lost on their fraud
challenge to an arbitration addendum to a mobile home sales
agreement.'57 The consumers claimed that the seller's failure to
disclose or explain the addendum amounted to fraud due to the
negative impact of the arbitration requirement on the consumers'
rights. The court quickly rejected the consumers' nondisclosure
argument, echoing the majority of courts that decline to find any duty
to inform consumers about arbitration provisions."'
B. Growing Policy Concerns in Consumer Arbitration
Fairness concerns regarding arbitration clauses in uneven
bargaining contexts have already led Congress to bar enforcement of
arbitration requirements in active duty military members' consumer
credit contracts and in motor vehicle franchise contracts. ' 6° At the
same time, some commentators and public advocates have urged
Congress to ban pre-dispute arbitration agreements more broadly in
consumer and employment contexts. Consumer advocates argue
that companies use pre-dispute arbitration clauses to curtail
consumers' rights and remedies with respect to any future claims by
blocking court access. 162 Furthermore, these clauses often preclude
class actions, deny small claims relief, bar recovery of statutory
damages or attorneys' fees, and require consumers to bear potentially
high arbitration filing fees and costs.'63 Moreover, these arbitration
clauses usually catch consumers by surprise because they rarely read
156. In re FirstMerit Bank, 52 S.W.3d at 756.
157. Id. at 752-53, 758.
158. Id. at 758.
159. Id.; see also Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 862, 869-70 (D.
Or. 2002) (finding no duty to explain written agreements). But see Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1304-05 (9th Cir. 1994) (breaking from the majority to require
express agreement to arbitrate statutory claims).
160. See sources cited supra note 17.
161. See Marcia Coyle, Bills Would Curtail Arbitration, NAT'L L.J., July 30, 2007, at 4,
4 (discussing proposal of the 2007 Arbitration Fairness Act, which precluded pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in consumer and employment contracts, and noting bill support by
policymakers and groups such as Public Citizen, American Association for Justice, and the
National Association of Consumer Advocates). I have diverged from such proposals to
suggest procedural reforms that allow for beneficial and fair consumer arbitration
programs. Schmitz, supra note 101, at 50-57.
162. See Coyle, supra note 161, at 4.
163. See Schmitz, supra note 101, at 40-41, 55-56.
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or understand the impact of the clauses.1'6
Consumers who seek to resist such arbitration provisions
generally lose the fight due to lack of bargaining power and contract
choices.16 ' As mentioned above, my own examination of nine of the
biggest cell phone service providers' consumer contracts exemplifies
this lack of power and choice to the extent that all the companies
included arbitration clauses and barred class actions in their form
contracts. Only two stated arbitration as an "option."166 Despite these
contracting realities, however, courts generally enforce form
arbitration terms per the FAA and contractual liberty directives."
These adhesive realities of consumer arbitration led to the
creation of the Protocol and other standards encouraging protection
of procedurally fair consumer arbitration. 16 Drafters expected that
companies and providers would voluntarily follow the standards'
"shoulds," which include clear notice of arbitration clauses, provision
of information regarding the arbitration process, preservation of
consumers' access to small claims court, and measures ensuring
reasonable costs and hearing locations for consumers.169 Accordingly,
many arbitration providers have promulgated procedural fairness
standards or special rules for consumer arbitration that comply with
these "shoulds."'7 ° Furthermore, some attorneys have encouraged
companies to comply with such standards in adopting arbitration
provisions in their consumer contracts."'
164. See supra Part II (discussing "dominos of deference" to form provisions); James
C. Freund, Calling All Deal Lawyers-Try Your Hand at Resolving Disputes, 62 Bus.
LAw. 37, 42-44 (2006) (explaining "deal lawyers" use of boilerplate provisions without
considering conflict avoidance).
165. See Charles L. Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out? An Argument for Strict
Scrutiny of Individual Contracts, 40 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 95, 101-04, 110-18 (2006)
(recognizing the dominance of drafters and form documents in consumer contracts).
166. Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 10.
167. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing enforcement of arbitration
clauses).
168. PROTOCOL, supra note 8.
169. JAMS, JAMS POLICY ON CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS PURSUANT TO PRE-
DISPUTE CLAUSES: MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS (2007)
[hereinafter JAMS CONSUMER POLICY], available at http://www.jamsadr.com/arbitration/
consumer_min_std.asp.
170. See id.; Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Statement of Ethical Principles for the American
Arbitration Association, an ADR Provider Organization (2007),
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22036 [hereinafter AAA, Statement of Ethical Principles];
see also Weidemaier, supra note 19, at 87-88 (discussing these different standards).
171. Kaplinsky, supra note 10, at 51 ("My message to clients: Draft a fair clause!"); R.
Christian Bruce, Neutrality of Arbitrators Needs Scrutiny, Attorney Says, Calling for More
Discovery, 68 U.S. L. WK. 2095, 2095 (1999) (noting Kaplinsky's advice that clients adopt
balanced arbitration provisions and allow consumers to choose the administrator in order
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Some attorneys have nonetheless suggested or drafted onerous
arbitration clauses for their corporate clients' consumer contracts.
Harsh arbitration clauses therefore appear in common consumer
contracts, creating debated perils this article will not fully recount."'
Suffice it to say that harsh arbitration clauses may hinder consumers'
access to judicial remedies for vindicating statutory and contract
rights, allow companies to avoid regulation and accountability, and
deny the public access to information affecting health, safety, and
other important policies.173
Furthermore, expansion of arbitration does not necessarily ease
judicial caseloads, as consumers continually challenge arbitration
clauses and awards due to dissatisfaction with companies' use of
arbitration clauses. 74 In addition, consumers' negative attitudes
toward arbitration and companies' contracting practices may
negatively impact the overall market. 75 Consumer-oriented blogs and
other Internet postings alone reveal consumers' distrust of companies'
contracts and recount consumers' stories of how companies make it
difficult or impossible for consumers to obtain copies of contracts or
to reach representatives with authority to change form terms. 76
to ward off repeat-player bias claims).
172. See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the
Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996)
(critiquing companies' use of arbitration clauses in contracts with consumers and
employees); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: "One Size Fits All" Does Not Fit,
16 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 759 (2001) (critiquing arbitration of consumer and
employment claims). See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward
Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381,
1410-14 (1996) (critiquing the use of arbitration provisions in the securities industry); Teri
J. Dobbins, The Hidden Costs of Contracting: Barriers to Justice in the Law of Contracts, 7
J.L. Soc'Y 116, 116-17 (2005) (discussing lower-income individuals' disadvantages in
bargaining for and enforcing contract remedies).
173. See Bruce, supra, note 171, at 2095 (gathering articles discussing these and other
perils of consumer arbitration).
174. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
175. Surveys suggest that consumers generally distrust and feel helpless against
companies' form contracts and arbitration clauses. See Amy J. Schmitz, Consumer Focus
Group Notes, Denver, Colo., Nov. 18, 2006 (on file with the South Texas Law Review)
[hereinafter Consumer Focus Group]. But see generally Drahozal, supra note 126
(highlighting conflicting evidence regarding arbitration's "lawlessness").
176. See Consumer Focus Group, supra note 175 (recounting instances when
salespersons lacked the power to change arbitration provisions in their company's form
contract); Posting of Victoria Pynchon to Settle It Now Negotiation Blog, The Fine Print:
Sprint's Arbitration Clause, http://www.negotiationlawblog.com/articles/arbitration/
consumer-contracts (July 7, 2007) (reporting company's representative's
"Huhhhhhhhhhh?????????" response to a request to see the contract terms); Annalee
Newitz, Dangerous Terms: A User's Guide to EULAs, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
Feb. 2005, http://www.eff.org/wp/dangerous-terms-users-guide-eulas (discussing arbitration
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Of course, one may question the legitimacy of consumers'
negative attitudes toward arbitration in light of the lack of empirical
evidence regarding consumer arbitration.177 Furthermore, there is
some mixed evidence that suggests consumers may fare better in
arbitration than in litigation.1 7 ' This provides attorneys with some fuel
for advocating adoption of arbitration clauses in companies' consumer
contracts and assisting them in enforcing these clauses.
Still, something is driving consumers' negativity toward
arbitration. Furthermore, Congress already has banned use of
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts offered to military members,
and congressional concerns about consumer arbitration prompted
recent hearings questioning the fairness of consumer arbitration.
This leaves attorneys confused regarding their proper role in drafting
and enforcing consumer arbitration clauses.
III. ATTORNEYS' ADVOCACY AND ADVISORY OBLIGATIONS IN
CONSUMER ARBITRATION
A. Advocacy Duties in Drafting and Enforcing Consumer Arbitration
Clauses
Legal and economic arguments tempt corporate attorneys to take
advantage of consumer arbitration clauses. The law generally supports
enforcement of un-negotiated consumer arbitration clauses, while
arbitration providers and practitioners promote arbitration clauses for
their potential to curb companies' dispute resolution costs and contain
consumers' mass class action claims. Attorneys then view these
arguments through the Model Rules' advocacy lens directing them to
terms in consumer "click-through" contracts, which consumers often cannot see before
completing the purchase).
177. Drahozal, supra note 126, at 204-15; Weidemaier, supra note 19, at 84-89.
178. See HARRIS INTERACTIVE, ARBITRATION: SIMPLER, CHEAPER, AND FASTER
THAN LITIGATION 26 (2005), available at http://www.arb-forum.com/rcontrol/
documents/ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/2005HarrisPoll.pdf (indicating that among those
who lost, 40% still said they were moderately to highly satisfied with the fairness of the
process).
179. See, e.g., Mandatory Binding Arbitration Agreements: Are They Fair to
Consumers?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of F. Paul Bland, Jr., Staff
Attorney). See also Simone Baribeau, Consumer Advocates Slam Credit-Card Arbitration,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 16, 2007, at 13, 13-14 (discussing lack of consent and
onerous terms in consumer arbitration clauses and Congressional hearings regarding the
fairness of arbitration).
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abide by clients' objectives within the limits of the law.' 8° This has
fostered some corporate attorneys' reliance on their advocacy
obligations to draft onerous consumer arbitration provisions for their
clients "as close to the line separating enforceable from unenforceable
agreements as is in their clients' interests."''
Advocacy obligations therefore prompt attorneys to suggest and
draft consumer arbitration clauses as means not only for generating
time and economic efficiencies, but also for curbing consumer
claims." They also may equip these clauses with procedural
provisions that benefit the clients' economic and reputational
interests, but effectively deny consumers' reasonable access to
evidence and remedies.183 Resulting arbitration clauses may then
include some or all of the following: curtailed discovery, preclusion of
class relief, denial of small claims court access, designation of hearing
locations in the corporations' hometowns, limits on consumers'
recovery of attorneys' fees, and caps on statutory damages'
At first glance, these clauses may appear reasonable in light of
pro-enforcement law and efficiency assumptions. Furthermore,
attorneys may justify these clauses based on claims that even if one-
sided arbitration clauses disadvantage some consumer claimants, they
promote the greater consuming public because they provide
companies with cost-savings they may pass on through lower prices
and interest rates and higher quality goods and services."' In addition,
some have proposed that private dispute resolution of small consumer
matters clears court dockets to make way for cases some see as more
worthy of public trials. 86
At the same time, corporate clients armed with these pro-
arbitration assumptions may expressly request attorneys to draft
consumer arbitration clauses equipped with the pro-company
180. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2007) (discussing an attorney's
role as an advocate).
181. See Malin, supra note 34, at 801 (discussing how some may view advocacy in
drafting arbitration clauses).
182. See Carrington, supra note 60, at 370 (discussing how the ethics rules' adversary
focus may give attorneys the impulse to draft consumer arbitration clauses for corporate
clients that take advantage of consumers).
183. Id. at 361-63, 370.
184. Id. at 362.
185. See Ware, Adhesive Arbitration Agreements, supra note 31, at 254-55, 258-59
(discussing arguments in favor of arbitration).
186. See Arthur B. Pearlstein, The Justice Bazaar: Dispute Resolution Through
Emergent Private Ordering as a Superior Alternative to Authoritarian Court Bureaucracy,
22 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 739, 739-40 (2007) (arguing that private systems allow for
flexible and equitable remedies, and individualized justice based on customary law).
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provisions discussed above. Companies also may seek to adopt such
provisions in light of trade publications, norms in their industries, or
arbitration providers' marketing materials.1 7 This may then heighten
attorneys' temptation to take advantage of consumer arbitration
based on the Model Rules' advocacy directive to heed clients'
wishes."8
Furthermore, an attorney's advocacy obligations may have
special force when representing a client in enforcing or defending an
arbitration provision the attorney drafted. It would be in the client's
and the attorney's financial, legal, and reputational interests to resist
any consumer challenges to an arbitration provision the attorney
drafted and the company incorporated in its widely-used consumer
form contracts. The company would want to establish precedent
endorsing the provision. The drafting attorney would fear loss of a
client, or even allegations of malpractice.
Advocacy obligations also would likely prompt an attorney to
assist a company in enforcing or defending a consumer arbitration
provision the company had adopted on its own or pursuant to another
attorney's advice. In this case, the attorney would not be defending
her own work, but may nonetheless want to assist the company in its
enforcement or defense objectives. Furthermore, understandable
business incentives would fuel the attorney's desire to gain or retain
the client, especially a well-paying corporate client.
At the same time, it would be difficult to argue that the Model
Rules preclude an attorney from representing a client in enforcing or
defending a seemingly enforceable consumer arbitration clause. The
Model Rules do not authorize discipline for doing so. This only would
be true if the attorney knowingly submitted false or fraudulent
evidence, documents, or testimony in court in pursuing an
enforcement or defense action.' 89 Discipline may also be warranted if
an attorney seeks to enforce or defend an obviously unenforceable
arbitration clause or a clause adopted for the clear purpose of denying
consumers' access to remedies on their legitimate claims.
187. See Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Consumer Advocates as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Respondents app. 5, PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003) (No. 02-
215) (presenting an arbitration provider's marketing letters to lenders that promoted its
rules and procedures to "minimize lawsuits, and the threat of lender liability jury
verdicts").
188. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl., para. 2 (2007) (stating that as an
advocate, a lawyer has to zealously assert a client's position).
189. Id. R. 3.3(a).
190. See Carrington, supra note 60, at 361-63, 380-84 (explaining how the Model
Rules leave room for attorneys to be disciplined for drafting contract provisions aimed to
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Broader ethical considerations nonetheless may justify requiring
an attorney to temper advocacy of onerous consumer arbitration
provisions. Instead, attorneys should stop to consider an arbitration
clause's impact on consumer rights and remedies. An attorney should
decline to represent a client in defending or enforcing an arbitration
clause that appears, upon reflection, to be unconscionable or overly
burdensome on consumers' procedural and substantive rights. In such
cases, the client generally does not need the attorney's technical
assistance in the same way a criminal defendant would need the
attorney's assistance. 91 Moreover, there generally is no overriding
social need for the promotion of unconscionable or unjust arbitration.
The tough questions, however, remain in determining what is
sufficiently "unfair or unjust" in arbitration to limit attorneys' conduct
in this way.
These same questions pervade attorneys' advocacy obligations in
drafting and negotiating arbitration provisions. The Model Rules
place only narrow limits on attorneys' contracting conduct and do not
expressly bar attorneys from drafting unconscionable contracts.l9,
Again, they only bar attorneys from making material
misrepresentations or knowingly pursuing illegal objectives in drafting
and negotiating contracts.' 9' They therefore preclude only intentional
or knowing conduct that is clearly calculated to achieve illegal or
fraudulent objectives.'"
The spirit of ethics obligations nonetheless suggest further limits
on attorneys' zeal in drafting consumer arbitration clauses. In these
contexts, there is no real adversary to resist onerous provisions and no
neutral third party to ensure fair process.'95 Consumers rarely read, let
alone have the power or resources to fully comprehend or negotiate
form arbitration clauses."9 Instead, they are at the mercy of companies
strip individuals' necessary procedural rights).
191. See Schwartz, supra note 41, at 548-50 (explaining how criminal trials are
governed by substantially different rules than civil ones and clients rely on attorney in
criminal contexts much more than in civil ones).
192. See Carrington, supra note 60, at 361-63, 380-84 (noting how the Model Rules do
not expressly authorize discipline).
193. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c), R. 1.2(d).
194. Id. R. 1.2(d).
195. See Carrington, supra note 60, at 361-62, 370-73 (noting limits of attorneys'
advocacy impulses in consumer contracting and arguing that professional responsibility
rules bar attorneys from drafting arbitration clauses that strip individuals' procedural
rights, which they need to vindicate substantive rights). See also Schwartz, supra note 60
(proposing restraints on attorney conduct in contracting).
196. See Carrington, supra note 60, at 364-66 (explaining realities of consumer form
contracting dynamics).
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and their attorneys to refrain from imposing onerous arbitration
provisions in their consumer contracts.
This means that attorneys should be attentive to consumers' lack
of bargaining power, understanding of arbitration, and legal resources
when drafting and enforcing form contracts. It also suggests that ethics
rules should bar them from taking advantage of these imbalances in
drafting form arbitration provisions that overly burden consumers'
access to remedies. 198 Attorneys must remain committed to protecting
justice, regardless of whether the Model Rules explicitly authorize
discipline for unfair contracting. This is especially applicable to
arbitration clauses that allow clients to escape liability and regulation
through inconvenient venue designations, preclusions of class relief,
and limitations on recovery of damages and attorneys' fees. 19'
Furthermore, justice responsibilities urge attorneys to temper "repeat-
player" advantages in arbitration by resisting temptation to draft
clauses that curtail consumers' equal voice in selecting arbitrators and
arbitration administrators.2°°
Of course, this again raises the question regarding when
arbitration provisions impose sufficiently onerous procedures to
warrant attorney discipline. Reasonable minds may disagree regarding
such fairness lines, and procedures that overly burden one consumer's
rights may be perfectly reasonable as applied to another consumer.
Consumers and contexts differ. Furthermore, attorneys' ethical
obligations may differ with respect to advocating or drafting
arbitration provisions versus advising clients regarding their use and
enforcement of consumer arbitration. 20'
197. See Consumer Focus Group, supra note 175 (noting consumers' feelings of
powerlessness indicated in consumer focus group responses).
198. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing proposals of Professor
Murray Schwartz regarding increased accountability in transactions due to absence of third
party neutral and ability to decline engagement).
199. See generally Carrington, supra note 60 (emphasizing that attorneys should refuse
to draft onerous arbitration clauses, even if they may advise clients that a clause may be
enforceable).
200. See Schwartz, supra note 22, at 60-61 (noting repeat-player advantages of
corporations in arbitration due to arbitrators' economic incentive to build "track records"
that "corporate repeat-users will view approvingly," thereby sparking referrals and future
arbitration business). See also Bruce, supra note 171, at 2095 (noting arguments for
drafting arbitration provisions that allow consumers to choose arbitration administrators).
201. See Carrington, supra note 60, at 388-89 (distinguishing attorneys' obligations in
these contexts and arguing that drafting onerous provisions "is the step beyond advice that
would expose the lawyer to possible liability").
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B. Attorneys' Textured Advisory Obligations Regarding Arbitration
Attorneys' counseling and advisory obligations add texture to
their duties with respect to drafting and enforcing arbitration clauses.
As an initial matter, attorneys have fuel for advising clients to include
arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts. Comment 5 to Model
Rule 2.1 encourages attorneys to inform clients about "forms of
dispute resolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to
litigation."' 2 The Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct include this
directive to advise clients about alternative dispute resolution in the
text of the rule."3 The Colorado Rules' comments also go further to
encourage attorneys to counsel clients about alternative dispute
resolution's impacts on relationships, scope of relief, confidentiality,
and privacy.'
This highlights assumptions courts, commentators, and
policymakers make about what constitutes "alternative dispute
resolution" (ADR) and its impact. Ethics rules do not distinguish
arbitration from other forms of ADR. For example, the comments to
Colorado's Rule 2.1 expressly include arbitration as a form of ADR
and suggest that all forms of ADR have positive impacts on
relationships, secrecy, and scope of relief."' Similarly, articles in
journals aimed at businesses and legal practitioners often laud
arbitration based on old blanket assumptions that all arbitration is
more expedient, flexible, and cost-effective than • .2
Many courts also act on these positive assumptions about
arbitration. In the McGuire, Cornwell & Blakey case discussed
above, for example, the court rejected breach of fiduciary and
professional duties challenges of arbitration provisions in both the
initial attorney retainer agreement and the modified fee contract the
parties signed after establishing an attorney-client relationship, 28 The
202. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 2.1 cmt. 5 (2007).
203. COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 2.1 (1993).
204. Id. R. 2.1 cmt.
205. Id. (clarifying that arbitration is among the alternatives to litigation that attorneys
should discuss with clients and tending to encourage such alternatives due to their impacts
on privacy, confidentiality, and scope of relief).
206. See, e.g., William H. Daughtrey, Jr. & Donnie L. Kidd, Jr., Shifting Attorney's
Fees in Litigation Attacking Commercial Arbitration Awards: A Disincentive for Meritless
Motions for Correction, Modification, or Vacatur, 35 AM. Bus. L.J. 515, 516, 519-21 (1998)
(boasting arbitration's "obvious" desirability).
207. Angell Enters., Inc. v. Abram & Hawkins Excavating Co., 643 NE.2d 362, 366
(Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (touting arbitration as "an easier, more expeditious manner" for
resolving disputes).
208. McGuire, Cornwell & Blakey v. Grider, 765 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (D. Colo. 1991).
[Vol. 49:841
2008] CONSUMER ARBITRA TION CLA USES
court concluded that the modified provision did not improperly
advantage the attorney or overly limit the attorney's liability for
malpractice in breach of applicable ethics rules, although the
provision carved out the attorney's collection actions against the client
and prescribed binding resolution by a committee of the Colorado Bar
Association.2 9
Such positive assumptions about arbitration have become almost
clich6. They foster attorneys' and corporations' failures to adequately
consider the real business and reputation risks of crafting onerous
arbitration provisions and drafting to the edge of enforceability. Such
provisions often invite expensive and time-consuming litigation
regarding their enforceability.1 Furthermore, consumers already
skeptical of arbitration and the market may shun companies that
impose harsh arbitration provisions. In addition, courts and
arbitrators may interpret or strike onerous provisions in arbitration
clauses to allow for class arbitration, recovery of attorneys' fees, and
possibly punitive damages awards.212 This may dismay companies that
rely on preclusions of such processes and remedies as paramount to
their arbitration programs' cost-effectiveness.213
"If we are to be good counselors, we must seek more solid bases
for making important process choices. 214 Attorneys should therefore
209. Id. at 1049-51 (concluding that arbitration clauses merely shift determination of a
client's claims to a non-judicial forum).
210. See discussion supra Part II.A.2 (noting some courts' application of contract
defenses to police the fairness of arbitration). See also Donna Shestowsky, Misjudging:
Implications for Dispute Resolution, 7 NEV. L.J. 487, 490-94 (2007) (explaining how
individuals focus on process and procedures in evaluating satisfaction with dispute
resolution mechanisms).
211. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text (describing consumer negativity
toward arbitration).
212. See Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003)
(acknowledging, but not exercising, its discretion to sever offending provisions in an
arbitration clause); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867-68 (Ct. App. 2002)
(severing prohibition of class proceedings in an arbitration clause to allow for class
arbitration).
213. See Kathleen M. Scanlon, Class Arbitration Waivers: The "Severability" Doctrine
and Its Consequences, Disp. RESOL. J., Feb.-Apr. 2007, at 40, 44 (advising corporate
counsel that "[a] practical approach is to include in ... arbitration clauses that contain a
class arbitration waiver an explicit provision making the entire arbitration clause
unenforceable in the event a court strikes the waiver provision" in order to save their
clients from being stuck in class arbitration that may "eliminat[e] the cost-effectiveness
associated with two-party arbitration"); see also Szetela, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868 (finding
Discover used the ban on class arbitration to effectively "prohibit[ I any effective means of
litigating Discover's business practices").
214. Wayne D. Brazil, Early Neutral Evaluation or Mediation? When Might ENE
Deliver More Value?, DiSP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2007, at 10, 10.
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explain to clients all factors relevant to consumer arbitration. What
appears best for the client on the surface may not be best in light of
this full panoply of concerns. For example, it may appear clear that a
credit card company client would save money and time by
promulgating an arbitration clause that precludes consumers' class
actions, small claims court access, and recovery of attorneys' fees or
statutory damages. This is risky, however, in that a court may find all
or part of the clause unconscionable and strike the clause, or enforce
arbitration without offending clauses. 15 A court may even require the
company to submit to class arbitration, which companies strongly
resist because it subjects them to possibly high class awards subject to
very limited judicial review.216
Furthermore, a company cannot necessarily ensure enforcement
of arbitration clauses by preserving access to small claims court or
agreeing to pay consumers' arbitration fees and costs."' Some courts
void arbitration clauses based on class action waivers alone.18
Moreover, a court that holds provisions in an arbitration clause
unconscionable may decline to accept a company's offer to waive the
suspect provisions in order to preserve the duty to arbitrate. 9 For
example, in the Bragg case discussed above, the court refused such an
offer because it would not "rewrite the agreement" to save a clause
215. Cooper v. QC Fin. Servs., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1281-86, 1290-91 (D. Ariz.
2007) (explaining the judicial disagreement regarding the enforceability of class-action
prohibitions in arbitration clauses and the various remedies a court may order after finding
such a class action waiver unconscionable).
216. Id. at 1290-91 (severing the class relief prohibition from the arbitration clause,
after finding it unconscionable, and allowing an arbitrator to determine whether the case
should proceed to class arbitration); Scanlon, supra note 213, at 44 (advising companies on
how to avoid class arbitration); Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 10 (noting all
nine cell phone service providers' arbitrations clauses expressly preclude class relief, five of
which also expressly barred class arbitration procedures and three of which voided the
arbitration provision if the preclusion was deemed unenforceable). See also Am.
Arbitration Ass'n, AAA Policy on Class Arbitrations, July 14, 2005,
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25967; AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES
FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS (2003), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?ID=21936 (listing the
American Arbitration Association's new class arbitration rules); Weidemaier, supra note
19, at 70-71, 111-12 (emphasizing how arbitration can benefit consumers, and highlighting
the potential for consumers to aggregate their claims through class arbitration
proceedings).
217. See Cooper, 503 F. Supp. 2d at 1288-90 (finding such company concessions did
not alleviate the unconscionability of the class waiver as applied to consumers' claims).
218. Id. at 1290.
219. See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 612 (E.D. Pa. 2007)
(refusing to compel arbitration despite the company's offer to waive the unconscionable
procedures in its arbitration clause).
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that the company itself drafted."
In addition, companies' imposition of onerous arbitration terms
may negatively impact their reputations and heighten consumers'
skepticism regarding arbitration."' Companies may also be dismayed
when information regarding arbitration proceedings becomes public
despite arbitration's touted "privacy." It is true that arbitration is
generally private in terms of who may attend hearings and view
awards, but arbitration is not necessarily confidential with respect to
information revealed in the course of proceedings.222 Furthermore,
even if companies include confidentiality protections in their
arbitration clauses, this will not prevent information from becoming
public in any subsequent court proceeding regarding the arbitration.
Such confidentiality agreements also fail to bind non-signatories, and
some courts hold these agreements unconscionable in uneven
bargaining contexts.223
These textured considerations have led some commentators and
attorneys to urge companies to promulgate fair and balanced
arbitration provisions in order to maximize the benefits of their
arbitration programs.224 They have warned contract drafters that they
should avoid suspect arbitration provisions such as those allowing for
pro-company carve-outs, inconvenient location designations, high
arbitration initiation fees, and shortened limitations periods.225 Many
companies therefore voluntarily comply with the Protocol and other
due process standards,226 which may foster fair and efficient arbitration
220. Id.
221. Consumer Focus Group, supra note 175 (noting participants' negative
perceptions of companies' arbitration clauses).
222. Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1211, 1211 (2006) (explaining that arbitration proceedings are usually private in that
only the parties, the arbitrator, and invited persons may attend, but that communications
are generally not confidential unless the parties agree to such confidentiality).
223. Id.; Anjanette H. Raymond, Confidentiality in a Forum of Last Resort: Is the Use
of Confidential Arbitration a Good Idea for Business and Society?, 16 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 479, 494-98, 500-05 (2005) (noting United States cases holding confidentiality
provisions unconscionable and explaining how these clauses can harm businesses and the
public).
224. Kaplinsky, supra note 10, at 51-52 (suggesting that attorneys and companies
should adopt fair arbitration clauses).
225. See id.; David M. Klein, Ways to Avoid Electronic Contract Killers in Second Life,
LEGAL TECH., Oct. 16, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/legaltechnology/
pubArticleLT.jsp?id=1192439008771 (noting how drafters of arbitration provisions in e-
contracts can avoid a finding of unconscionability like that found in Bragg v. Linden
Research, Inc.); see also Leslie A. Bailey, Preserving Employment Class Actions, TRIAL,
Aug. 2007, at 26, 27-29 (noting when courts are likely to strike onerous arbitration
provisions in advising employees' attorneys in challenging arbitration provisions).
226. See Collected Arbitration Provisions, supra note 10 (showing, out of the credit
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proceedings to the benefit of companies and consumers."'
At the same time, attorneys' counseling obligations include
advising clients on how their contemplated actions and objectives
impact third parties and the justice system. Again, there is no neutral
third party to temper or balance attorney-client discussions, and
attorneys remain obligated to promote justice as officers of the court.
They therefore should advise clients not to adopt arbitration clauses
that appear unconscionable or unjust and refrain from drafting such
clauses at the clients' behest.2 Unconscionable clauses are not only
legally unenforceable but also obfuscations of voluntary self-
government vital to contractual freedom and due process.229
Furthermore, attorneys should advise clients to refrain from
drafting to the edge of enforceability. Arbitration provisions should
not be fair game simply because they are "in fashion" and may pass
judicial scrutiny.23° Pushing legal limits may subject clients to
inefficient and expensive litigation that discounts any victories in
obtaining judicial enforcement of arbitration. Moreover, attorneys'
ethical obligations to public policy and justice require attorneys to
advise clients against arbitration provisions that may be enforceable
but nonetheless overburden consumers' access to remedies on their
claims. Indeed, attorneys have heightened duties to draft balanced
arbitration clauses because of their potential to effectually deregulate
company conduct and deny consumers access to procedural rights and
substantive remedies.f'
What should an attorney do, however, if a client ignores such
advice and insists that the attorney draft an onerous consumer
arbitration provision. For example, the hypothetical credit card
card contracts gathered, some did not include arbitration clauses while a couple allowed
the consumer to opt out of arbitration).
227. The key should be to embrace procedural rules that balance fairness and
efficiency, without "judicializing" the arbitration process with court-like procedures. See
WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES: STUDIES IN
LAW AND PRACTICE 44-64 (2006) (discussing fairness versus efficiency of precise
procedural rules).
228. See supra Part I.A (discussing proposals of Professors Carrington and Schwartz
for increased attorney accountability in advising clients).
229. See Fuller & Randall, supra note 33, at 1162 (highlighting how attorneys serving
as negotiators and draftsman should foster public interest in facilitating "voluntary self-
government").
230. See Carrington, supra note 60, at 361-70 (noting how some of the arbitration
clauses "in fashion" can be so onerous that they "disgrace" the legal profession).
231. See supra Part III.A (discussing Professor Carrington's arguments for attorney
discipline for allowing clients to use arbitration clauses to escape regulation); Fuller &
Randall, supra note 33, at 1162 (emphasizing how attorneys' "partisan advocacy" must
cease "when it misleads, distorts and obfuscates" the justice process).
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company client may request creation of an onerous consumer
arbitration clause despite its attorney's contrary advice. It would then
seem that the attorney's advocacy obligations would compel her to
draft the clause with the requested preclusions of class relief, small
claims court access, and recovery of attorneys' fees or statutory
damages. The attorney's duties to the public and the justice system,
however, may suggest that the attorney should refuse to draft the
onerous arbitration clause and discontinue representation of a client
that persists in promulgating the clause.f 2
IV. CONCLUSION
Attorneys face mixed and murky messages regarding consumer
arbitration: mixed professional responsibility rules; mixed legal
enforcement; mixed messages from commentators and policymakers;
mixed evidence regarding efficiency, cost-savings, and fairness. It is
therefore doubtful that attorneys would face discipline for drafting or
enforcing onerous consumer arbitration provisions they believe in
good faith to be lawful. Professional discipline rules, however, merely
set the floor for ethical conduct and can only go so far in dictating
morals or teaching values. 33 Indeed, an attorney's commitment to
ethics and public service "must begin at home., 234 Moreover, the
bottom line is: "If you have the wrong values and motives, your life
will not feel good regardless of how good it looks. 235
Attorneys representing companies in drafting or enforcing
consumer arbitration clauses should therefore remain committed to
justice and ethical considerations that transcend stark professional
conduct rules. This means that they should go beyond rote
assumptions of arbitration's benefits to consider the real risks and
impacts of onerous arbitration provisions. It also means that they
should refuse to draft provisions that, upon reflection, appear likely to
conceal companies' illegal conduct or squelch consumers' procedural
and substantive rights.
Instead, attorneys should heighten clients' awareness and
consideration of the real legal, business, reputation, and fairness
impacts of onerous arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. At the
least, attorneys should counsel clients to follow the Protocol and offer
232. Fuller & Randall, supra note 33, at 1162.
233. See Schiltz, supra note 29, at 908-10 (explaining why the Model Rules are only
the "lowest common denominator" for ethical conduct).
234. Fuller & Randall, supra note 33, at 1162.
235. Krieger, supra note 30, at 438.
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additional suggestions for balancing efficiency and fairness through
use of arbitration. Companies and consumers may benefit from
arbitration clauses that provide fair and balanced procedures.
Moreover, fair use of consumer arbitration promotes the substance
and spirit of attorneys' ethical obligations.236
236. It may also foster authentic and happy attorneys who conform their conduct to
their intrinsic values and norms. See id. at 425-30 (emphasizing the importance of intrinsic
values and motivations to producing professional conduct and how such ethical conduct
leads to more life satisfaction); ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY
51-57, 167-69 (2d ed. 1970) (explaining how those pursuing higher needs and values
become more actualized, and thus satisfied).
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